TÜRKİYE ORTA ASYA HABER KKUORDİNATÖRÜ

INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT HOUSE The Black Sea Region and the Impact of the War: geopolitics, geoeconomics and security ‘transversal costs’ and ‘unintended benefits’ Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine, which broke out on 24 February 2022, has prompted significant geopolitical shifts in the broader Black Sea region. The traditional balance of power has been altered markedly. The powers bordering the region have seized the middle the emerging “windows of opportunity” arising from the withdrawal of war-torn Russia from what it perceives as its natural geopolitical sphere. The parties at war – Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, Russia encountered costs from war destruction and sanctions, respectively. Other Black Sea countries benefited from the unintended implications of the war caused by the disruptions in the transport logistical chains and trade flows. Overall, the Black Sea region underwent significant militarisation, war-related destruction of critical littoral infrastructure, ecological degradation, shifts in trade and energy flows, and compromised navigability for civilian and military vessels. Read the full publication here To determine the future development of the Black Sea region, this paper proposes a three-level analysis. Firstly, the implications of the war are laid out for the littoral states (Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova and Georgia). The impact is examined through three specific lenses: geopolitics, geoeconomics and security and defense. Secondly, the paper explores three primary scenarios for the settlement of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, which can be categorized into the following: (1) “strong peace and geopolitical harmony”; (2) “The absence of war coupled with geopolitical disunity”; and finally, (3) “frozen conflict” with potential future military escalations. Finally, the third section of the paper analyzes how each of these scenarios will influence the Black Sea region as a whole, using country-based examples of developments that could arise as an outcome. As Russia, an aggressor state, and Ukraine, the victim of the war, engaged in costly military conflict, the Black Sea region and the coastal countries experienced various “unintended consequences,” as outlined below. • Firstly, the geopolitical landscape has witnessed a certain degree of rebalancing of the weight of powers. Turkey attempted to consolidate its political positions, offering mediation to establish the shortlived “grain deal” and the failed conflict cessation efforts (the 2022 Istambul talks). Despite these failures, up until Donald Trump's reelection as US President, Turkey was the only international actor trusted by Ukraine and Russia. In the regions next to the Black Sea, such as the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan took advantage of Russian absence to put an end to the Karabakh territorial conflict in 2023, which caused the exodus of more than 100,000 Armenian minorities. This was followed by the freezing of the Armenian participation in the Organization of the Collective Treaty, compounded by the withdrawal of Russian border guard troops from the Armenian main airport (Zvartnots) and the sole border checkpoint (Agarak) at the border with Iran. • Secondly, the geoeconomic picture underwent considerable changes due to the devastating impact of Russian air strikes on Ukraine's logistical capacities in the Black Sea port infrastructure. The diversion of Ukrainian exports transformed Romania into a regional hub for shipping Ukrainian grain production. The allocation of 300 million euros to Romanian port infrastructure aimed to improve connectivity with parts of Ukrainian shipping infrastructure in the Danube region (Reni, Izmai and Kiliia), half hit by Russian airstrikes. Prior to the investments announced in the modernization of shipping at Constanţa Port, Romania facilitated the transport of approximately 60% of Ukrainian grain during the first two years of the war. Other aspects of the Black Sea geoeconomics is the change in trade patterns. The combined effect of the US and EU sanctions on Russia pushed it to search for alternatives. Thus, Türkiye played the market from which Russia acquired under-sanction goods from Western producers who divested to avoid reputational or secondary sanction costs associated with Russia. Turkish exports to Russia increased from 5.7 billion dollars in 2021 to 10.9 billion dollars in 2023, including re-exporting 50 sensitive goods registered, only partially banned in October 2024. • Thirdly and lastly, the security of the region has been seriously shaken. The safety of navigability in the Black Sea decreased because of the effects of mining conducted by the warring side to protect their coastlines. Besides posing navigation risks and impacting coastal leisure businesses, communities, and the biosphere, particularly along the shores of Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, the mines also jeopardise the largest EU gas extraction site (N