TÜRKİYE ORTA ASYA HABER KKUORDİNATÖRÜ

Why Türkiye Is at a Tipping Point Between Democracy and Authoritarianism As the regime ratchets up repression, two factors work in its favor—but protests and increased international pressure offer hope for democracy. by Andrew O’Donohue Published on March 26, 2025 blog Emissary Emissary harnesses Carnegie’s global scholarship to deliver incisive, nuanced analysis on the most pressing international affairs challenges. Learn More program Democracy, Conflict, and Governance The Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program is a leading source of independent policy research, writing, and outreach on global democracy, conflict, and governance. It analyzes and seeks to improve international efforts to reduce democratic backsliding, mitigate conflict and violence, overcome political polarization, promote gender equality, and advance pro-democratic uses of new technologies. Learn More Last Wednesday, the government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sharply increased its use of repression by arresting the leading voice of the opposition, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, and banning popular protests. As tens of thousands of protesters have mobilized nationwide in defiance, Türkiye’s regime has cracked down harder, detaining more than a thousand demonstrators, arresting journalists, and jailing İmamoğlu. These events represent a dangerous inflection point between democracy and full authoritarianism for Türkiye’s already repressive regime. Since 2015, Türkiye has been a textbook example of what political scientists call a competitive authoritarian regime: a system in which the government’s abuse of state power tilts the playing field of political competition in its favor. But until now, Erdoğan had refrained from crossing the Rubicon of arresting his main rival. İmamoğlu, who was named on Monday as the main opposition party’s presidential candidate, consistently outperforms Erdoğan in public opinion polls. The key question now facing Türkiye is whether Erdoğan’s gambit to repress the opposition will succeed—or whether societal and international pressure can force the regime to reverse its course. Troublingly, the best research in political science by scholars Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way suggests that two factors work strongly in the regime’s favor: an international environment permissive of repression and the ruling party’s vast sway over state institutions. But one key variable cuts in favor of the opposition: mass societal protests that have surprised Türkiye’s regime with their speed and scale and that could galvanize Türkiye’s state institutions and the international community to support democratization. The first factor that enables Erdoğan’s escalating repression is geopolitical: Türkiye’s Western allies have been increasingly unable or unwilling to apply pro-democratic pressure. The president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has called İmamoğlu’s arrest “deeply concerning.” Yet the European Union thus far has not imposed significant costs, such as sanctions on Turkish government officials, in response to this repression, almost certainly due to Ankara’s geopolitical leverage. Especially as the new U.S. administration has shown it would withdraw support for Ukraine, the EU increasingly depends on Türkiye as a military partner. Earlier this month, Erdoğan signaled that Ankara could send peacekeeping troops to Ukraine. And since 2016, the EU has relied heavily on Türkiye for cooperation on limiting migration to Europe: Türkiye hosts more than 3 million registered Syrian refugees. Across the Atlantic, the new U.S. administration has scant interest in criticizing allies’ transgressions against democracy. In 2022, when a Turkish court convicted İmamoğlu in a separate, highly politicized case, the U.S. State Department expressed that it was “gravely concerned and disappointed” by the verdict. The State Department has issued no such statement to date on the current situation. Instead, the administration is effectively giving a green light to Türkiye’s repression. Last Friday, just days after İmamoğlu’s detention, U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff described President Donald Trump’s recent phone call with Erdoğan as “great.” On Tuesday, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met his Turkish counterpart in Washington to discuss warmer ties and made only brief mention of “concerns regarding recent arrests and protests in Türkiye.” The second card in Erdoğan’s hand is domestic: Türkiye’s government wields control of a well-organized, coercive state apparatus. Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party, or AKP, have held power for more than two decades. By purging and packing state institutions, they have acquired vast influence over Türkiye’s judiciary, police, and military. Absent major pressure from pro-democratic protests, these institutions are likely to uphold the regime’s repression. Consider Erdoğan’s control over Türkiye’s courts. After an attempted coup in July 2016, Türkiye’s gover