TÜRKİYE ORTA ASYA HABER KKUORDİNATÖRÜ

IFJ-INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF JOURNALİST BROOKINGS: Commentary Understanding Turkey’s response to the Israel-Gaza crisis Editor's note: This piece is part of the Center for Middle East Policy’s Israel-Gaza interviews series, in which leading experts unpack the conflict via in-depth Q&As. For an extended discussion of the political and ideological sources of Turkey’s approach to the present crisis in Gaza, please see: “The sultan’s ghost: Erdoğan and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” by Aslı Aydıntaşbaş. Turkey’s relationship with Israel and the Palestinian territories KEVIN HUGGARD: What approach has Turkey traditionally taken toward Israeli-Palestinian affairs under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan? How does this issue fit into Turkey’s broader foreign policy? ASLI AYDINTAŞBAŞ: The Palestinian issue is front and center to Erdoğan’s vision of where he wants to take Turkey. As two of the non-Arab states in the region, Turkey and Israel have long been fascinated with one another and have enjoyed close ties for much of their 74-year relationship. But over the past two decades under Erdoğan, relations have been tumultuous, often in parallel with the ups and downs in Israeli-Palestinian tensions. In 2009, Erdoğan walked out of a panel with Shimon Peres in Davos after accusing the former Israeli president of killing children. In 2010, a Turkish aid flotilla tried to break the blockade of Gaza, leading to a deadly Israeli raid and years of cold peace between the two countries. Although Turkey and Israel normalized ties in 2022, relations have dramatically worsened since Hamas’ October 7 attack and Israel’s military operations in Gaza. Erdoğan has taken a very harsh stance against Israel and the two countries have recalled their ambassadors — though trade relations continue. Under Erdoğan, Turkey’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian issue is distinctly different from the pre-Erdoğan, Kemalist period in two ways. The first is Erdoğan’s belief in the legitimacy of Hamas as a viable Palestinian actor, which is a natural outcome of his ideological affinity for the Muslim Brotherhood. Erdoğan believes Hamas needs to be part of the political process and has moved the Turkish establishment toward that idea. Hamas has had a presence in Turkey and sent delegations there since it won the Palestinian elections in 2006. I should note that Ankara’s engagement is with Hamas’ political wing; as far as I know, there has been no Turkish support for the group’s military wing in Gaza. But Erdoğan has been open about his political support for Hamas — whose political representatives were reportedly in Turkey at the time of the attack. Another distinction from the pre-Erdoğan age is the central role of the Palestinian issue in Turkey’s aspirations for regional leadership — and Erdoğan’s use of neo-Ottomanism to sell that idea to Turkish voters. The Turkish president has built his political platform on the theme of an ascending Turkey — with a historic responsibility to protect the dispossessed Muslim populations in the region, including, of course, the Palestinians. This notion of Turkish exceptionalism runs through all of Erdoğan’s foreign policy speeches and is at the core of his “Century of Turkey” platform. It also works well domestically for the voters: Erdoğan is the only leader standing up to Israel and the West, we are often told. This is how he wants to be remembered, as the leader who oversaw the rebirth of the Turkish empire and who hasn’t forgotten the Palestinians and Jerusalem. Turkey’s response to the crisis KEVIN HUGGARD: How has Turkey responded to the present crisis? In your policy paper, you write that the evidence suggests that “the Turkish establishment views this as an inflection point, not a passing flare-up of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” Given this, has the Turkish policy response thus far represented a departure from its traditional posture toward Israel-Palestine? ASLI AYDINTAŞBAŞ: Erdoğan is known for his pragmatism and his skillful use of geopolitics to expand Turkey’s interests. When it suits his interests, he is willing to drop principles, reverse course, straddle between the West and Russia, reconcile with enemies, and so on. But not on the Palestinian issue. There is no pragmatism there. Erdoğan sees it as his calling to take a position against what Israel is doing, even if the price is isolation. It is clearly personal, ideological, and near and dear to his heart. Turkey has taken the most strident anti-Israeli position within NATO, with Erdoğan organizing pro-Palestinian rallies himself and slamming both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the United States. But he may have gone overboard this time. Erdoğan has called Hamas a “liberation movement” — openly stating “Hamas is not a terrorist organization” and accusing Israel of commi