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IFJ-INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF JOURNALİST Online Analysis12th March 2025 Trump’s Latin America agenda: the risks of short-termism President Trump’s notably hostile agenda towards Latin America has resulted in some early progress in his priority goals of tackling drug trafficking, illegal migration and Chinese influence in the region. However, it is far from certain that his approach will achieve long-term success. Just a couple months into President Donald Trump’s second term, United States–Latin America relations have hit a new low. While past administrations largely overlooked the region, Trump’s ‘America First’ vision has gone beyond neglect to a position of overt hostility. His administration views Latin America primarily as a security threat, associating it with drug trafficking, organised crime and incoming migration, while also perceiving its ties with US geopolitical rivals, particularly China, as uncomfortably close. Based on this reading, the US approach has become essentially negative, prioritising unilateral action and dominance rather than partnership. In a revival of the nineteenth-century Monroe Doctrine, the region is being treated less as an equal partner and more as a sphere of influence to be controlled in line with US strategic interests. Trump has wasted no time in pushing forward his negative Latin America agenda. The region has been unusually prominent as a target of some of the array of domestic and foreign-policy measures already introduced by the new administration. These measures have included imposing a 25% tariff on goods (with some exceptions) from Mexico in retaliation for its perceived failure to curb the flow of fentanyl and migrants across the border; designating eight Latin American transnational criminal groups as foreign terrorist organisations (FTOs); threatening to take back control of the Panama Canal as a matter of national security; and initiating large-scale, often unlawful deportations of Latin American migrants, either to their home countries or to ‘safe’ third countries in the region. Trump’s muscular approach appears to be yielding some early success. However, its short-term focus and one-dimensional nature could undermine its stated goals in the long run. Pressuring Mexico and Panama into action The approaches taken by the US towards Mexico and Panama arguably serve as prime examples. Strengthening border security with Mexico is essential for US national security – and for assuaging voters’ concerns around uncontrolled migration and the ongoing fentanyl crisis. In turn, the Panama Canal, a vital artery for global trade and supply-chain resilience, plays a crucial role in US economic security and competitiveness while also being of critical military importance amid the intensifying great-power competition in the region. Trump’s blend of economic coercion, tariff weaponisation and threats of military intervention appears to have already produced some desired results. In Mexico, the administration of President Claudia Sheinbaum has shifted its security strategy away from its predecessor’s ‘hugs, not bullets’ approach, with a greater focus on confronting drug-trafficking organisations (DTOs) and illicit economies, resulting in noticeable progress in terms of fentanyl seizures and arrests. In February it deployed an additional 10,000 National Guard troops to reinforce border security against illegal migration and drug trafficking, and it deported 29 high-profile drug lords to the US for trial and sentencing – including Rafael Caro Quintero, one of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s ‘Ten Most Wanted Fugitives’. Border crossings by undocumented migrants have decreased dramatically, in February reaching their lowest levels in decades. In an effort to assuage US concerns about China’s growing economic presence in Mexico, the Sheinbaum administration has also expressed openness to raising tariffs on Chinese cars and auto parts. Meanwhile, in Panama, escalating US rhetoric around reclaiming the canal, with all options on the table, triggered government outrage but also steps to appease Washington. The administration of President José Raúl Mulino announced that Panama would not renew its participation in China’s flagship infrastructure-development strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative, and it stepped up cooperation with the US on migration by offering Panama as ‘bridge’ for US deportees while they await return to their countries of origin. Equally significantly, the Hong Kong-based corporation CK Hutchison has agreed to sell the operations of the Balboa and Cristóbal ports, located respectively at the Pacific and Atlantic ends of the Panama Canal Zone, to a consortium led by US asset manager BlackRock. If the Panamanian government approves the deal, it will effectively bring these strategic ports under American control. The limitations of a one-dimensional agenda The above developments represent early progress i