ORTA ASYA VE TÜRKİYE ENİSTITSÜ:USR

Central Asia and Turkey Institute USR Political Crisis in Türkiye: Its Impact on Central Asia and the Caucasus The crisis of confidence between Gülen and the AKP raises several questions about Türkiye's relationship with Central Asia and the Caucasus, where many Gülenist schools have developed. By Bayram Balcı Published by the Elliot School of International Affairs on April 30, 2014 Program Middle East The Middle East Program in Washington combines in-depth regional knowledge with sharp comparative analysis to offer insightful recommendations. With expertise in the Gulf, North Africa, Iran, and Israel/Palestine, we examine intersecting themes of political, economic, and social change in both English and Arabic. Learn More Source: Elliot School of International Affairs The AKP government, in power since 2002, has long benefited from the unconditional and valuable support of Fethullah Gülen's far-reaching influence. This influence is most evident in domestic politics, where the media network supports the government's efforts to democratize the state and its institutions, limit the political role of the military, and advance Türkiye's EU candidacy. Their close alliance has been equally, if not more, effective in foreign policy. This is particularly true in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, where the AKP and Gülen have spoken as one voice to establish Türkiye's cultural, economic, and political influence. This cooperation was sociologically even more harmonious because the AKP and Gülen shared a common social base. However, after weathering numerous crises in both foreign and domestic politics, this alliance collapsed on December 17, 2013.1 The rift between Türkiye's two most influential political and religious leaders affects the entire Turkish political system and Ankara's foreign policy, as Gülen's sphere of influence alone constitutes a significant component of Turkish soft power. This crisis is particularly relevant in Central Asia and the Caucasus, as it looms large in Ankara's policies and the actions of the Gülen network, which has the oldest and strongest presence outside Anatolia. The crisis of confidence between Gülen and the AKP raises several questions about Türkiye's relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus, where many Gülenist schools have developed. Among them are: How is the crisis affecting the post-Soviet space and how is it changing Turkish foreign policy in the region? More importantly, how will the societies and regimes of Central Asia and the Caucasus view the political and other intentions of graduates who join the schools of Fethullah Gülen and the ranks of local and national elites? The answers to these questions will include a brief overview of Turkish policy in the post-Soviet space and the Gülen network's place within it. Gülen's network serves Türkiye's soft power. To better understand the importance of Gülen's network in Central Asia, it is important to remember that Türkiye is one of the countries most interested in this new geopolitical space, populated predominantly by people whose language, culture, and religion are similar to Turkey's. 2 Turkey, the first to recognize its independence, embarked on an ambitious and unrealistic policy; its ultimate goal was to create a kind of Turkish bloc capable of exerting influence on the international stage. 3 However, after relative success, realism prevailed; Ankara realized it lacked the necessary tools to achieve such goals. Furthermore, it quickly became clear that the post-Soviet republics did not want Türkiye to become a new big brother that would limit their newly gained independence. Consequently, Türkiye's Central Asia policy became the work of private actors who proved more effective than the state in their strategies to adapt to new realities. The most influential and multifaceted of these actors was the Gülenist network, which effectively spearheaded Türkiye's policy in these countries. Defining Fethullah Gülen's network as a "movement" is hardly sufficient to describe an organization that, while visible, lacks clear boundaries and possesses a fluid geometry of identity. Initially, it could be described as a nebula of power. Strategic secrecy and transparency were privileged to maintain ambiguity in terms of both its identity, activities, and intentions. Its own members define their movement as service; that is, a community organized around "service" to individuals, society, and all humanity through education and dialogue between religions and cultures.5 In Central Asia and the Caucasus, Gülen's network has proven itself in various sectors, especially in the field of education.