TÜRKİYE ORTA ASYA HABER KKUORDİNATÖRÜ

IFJ-INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF JOURNALIST/ERTUĞRUL DEMİRÖZCAN Ertuğrul Demirözcan Ertuğrul Demirözcan June 25, 2025 C CARNEGE FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE After nearly fifty years, Türkiye’s main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), won a decisive victory in local elections in March, with nearly 38% of the national vote. Following its success in the municipalities of Istanbul and Ankara in 2019, the CHP expanded to municipalities in the Central Aegean, Black Sea and Central Anatolia regions this year. The significance of these results is further underscored by the apparent decline in support for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), including in its traditional strongholds across Turkey. Add to this the decline in votes for the İyi Party (İYİP) and the ability of the People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) to come in first place in most cities in the southeast and east of Anatolia, despite the government’s systematic efforts to restrict Kurdish political representation, and the March 31 elections may have changed the country’s political landscape. Scholars and experts have rightly noted that these unexpected results, especially after the opposition’s defeat in last year’s presidential and parliamentary elections, show President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s weaknesses and the weakening of his AKP. Some have gone further, arguing that the result provides “the first glimpse of a political future beyond the reigning strongman [Erdoğan]” and that “there is no fertile ground for authoritarian regimes to flourish in Türkiye.” Others have been more cautious about dismissing Erdoğan too early because of his reputation as “a survivor and a pragmatist.” Moreover, much depends on how the local governments won by the CHP perform. Nevertheless, there seems to be a general consensus that the aspiration for a “secular, democratic, pluralistic, inclusive and modern Turkey” is very solid. A comprehensive examination of the election results provides a more nuanced perspective. Two important observations emerge: First, despite the fragmentation of opposition groups, their voters have remained consistent in their collective opposition to the AKP and the People’s Alliance. While this anti-regime stance is the primary reason most opposition voters support the CHP, it is important to note the diverse composition of these voters that defies simple categorization. Second, the decline in support for the AKP is due to two interrelated factors: the party’s diminished capacity to mediate between the state and its citizens, and the diminishing resource pool to sustain clientelistic practices aimed at securing continued support. Opposition Voters Unite Against the AKP and the People’s Alliance Although the opposition alliance disintegrated after last year’s dual elections, leading to opposition parties fielding their own candidates, a heterogeneous coalition of voters has continued their collective resistance to the ruling alliance. A cursory comparison of the total votes received by parties in municipal council elections and mayoral elections provides a preliminary idea. While voters’ choices in municipal council elections are generally closely aligned with their party affiliations, mayoral elections often involve tactical voting beyond partisan preferences. The CHP won approximately 1.6 million more votes for mayoral positions than for municipal council representatives, underscoring the shift in tactical votes from other parties to the CHP. City-by-city analyses further confirm this initial observation. For example, in Istanbul, DEM voters overwhelmingly rallied behind CHP candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu. İmamoğlu also received significant support from supporters of other opposition parties, such as the IyiP and the Saadet Party (SP). In regions such as the Central Aegean and the Black Sea, CHP candidates received support from IyiP voters and, in some cases, from supporters of the relatively new Zafer Party (ZP). Beyond the widespread discontent with economic and political governance that was the main driver of CHP voters, the electorate is diverse. Their concerns range from concerns about “stealth Islamization” and state interference in personal lifestyles to issues related to immigration and the Kurdish issue, which are perceived primarily as a rights issue by some voters and as a security issue by others. For example, in Afyon, where the CHP won its first victory in seventy-four years, there was internal controversy when the party’s candidate, Burcu Köksal, expressed her intention to establish relations with all political parties except the DEM if elected during the election period. Köksal was among fifteen CHP politicians who joined IyiP in 2018, which enabled the latter to form a parliamentary group. Resentment towards immigrants and refugees emerged as another concern voiced by CHP candidates. In the party’s recently elected Uşak