TÜRKİYE ORTA ASYA HABER KKUORDİNATÖRÜ

Turkey’s political landscape has undergone a dramatic shift with the recent arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s most formidable rival. The pressure on Imamoglu has been building for some time, but events accelerated last week. On March 18, 2025, Istanbul University annulled Imamoglu’s undergraduate diploma, citing, according to the Associated Press, “alleged irregularities in his 1990 transfer from a university in Northern Cyprus.” Under Turkish law, presidential candidates are required to hold a university degree, making the annulment a direct barrier to his eligibility to run against Erdoğan in 2028. Just hours later, in the early morning of March 19, a sweeping police operation detained Imamoglu and several close associates on charges of corruption and financing terrorism. This triggered massive protests across major cities that were met with a forceful crackdown. On March 23, Imamoglu and top aides were formally arrested on corruption charges. The move marks a critical turning point for Turkey: but it is the beginning of a new phase of Erdoğan’s authoritarianism in which the last institutional pathways for democratic change—in particular, competitive elections—are being actively dismantled. Turkey’s Regime Change: From Competitive Authoritarianism to De Facto Autocracy Turkey has been on an authoritarian trajectory for more than a decade. Imamoglu is far from being the first opposition figure to be imprisoned; Kurdish politicians have long been jailed en masse, and the government has routinely replaced elected leaders of Kurdish municipalities with appointed trustees. The government’s control of the judiciary is widely acknowledged. The systematic detention of dissidents, near-complete government control over the media (just a few opposition outlets remain), the absence of freedom of expression, and the risk of arrest facing anyone who criticizes the government are all established features of Turkey’s political landscape. Turkey ranks dismally low in global indices on rule of law and freedom of expression: in the 2024 Press Freedom Index, it is classified as the 158th worst of 180 countries ranked, while in the World Justice Project’s 2024 Rule of Law Index, it is listed 117th out of 142. The systematic detention of dissidents and the absence of freedom of expression are features of Turkey’s political landscape. Yet despite these alarming conditions, one institution had continued to tether Turkey to a semblance of democratic legitimacy: elections. What set Turkey apart from fully authoritarian regimes like Russia was precisely this electoral mechanism—the remaining, albeit narrowing, path for effecting political change through the ballot box. Until now, Turkey had been considered a ‘competitive authoritarian’ system, where despite significant obstacles, the opposition theoretically maintained the possibility of taking power through elections. The opposition’s victories in Istanbul, Ankara, and other major cities in the 2019 and 2024 local elections reinforced this possibility, offering a glimmer of hope for democratic reversal. Turkey’s robust election system, where outright electoral fraud is nearly impossible to execute without being exposed, also supported this argument. However, Imamoglu’s arrest marks a significant escalation in Turkey’s authoritarian drift, crossing a critical threshold. By arresting his strongest electoral rival, Erdoğan appears intent on eliminating even the theoretical possibility of democratic transition, which fundamentally alters the nature of the system. This move aims to shut the door on power change through elections, making Imamoglu’s arrest a pivotal moment with far-reaching implications for Turkey’s future. An International Climate Conducive to Repression While the domestic machinery behind Imamoglu’s arrest had long been in motion, recent international developments created a permissive environment that emboldened Erdoğan to make his boldest authoritarian move yet. Chief among these is the return to power of US President Donald Trump, whose admiration for authoritarian leaders and his tendency to maintain good relations with them has generally emboldened strongman politicians worldwide. In this environment, Erdoğan likely believes that no significant response will come from the United States. The US Department of States’s initial response to the arrests, describing them simply as “internal judicial matters,” confirmed these expectations. Erdoğan also feels confident in his position with Europe, anticipating minimal pushback from that quarter as well. Europe’s approach to the Middle East is primarily filtered through migration concerns, and Turkey’s growing influence in Syria has increased its leverage over Europe. But the most significant development lies in transatlantic relations. With Trump’s presidency, European confidence in the long-term reliability of US security guarantees has diminished, prompting discussions about