TÜRKİYE ORTA ASYA HABER KKUORDİNATÖRÜ

Global Locations Why Turkey Is at a Crossroads Between Democracy and Authoritarianism As the regime steps up the pressure, two factors work in its favor; but the protests and growing international pressure offer hope for democracy. By Andrew O’Donohue Published March 26, 2025 blog Emissary Emissary draws on Carnegie’s global scholarship to deliver incisive, detailed analysis of the most pressing international relations challenges. Learn More Program Democracy, Conflict, and Governance The Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program is a leading source of independent policy research, writing, and outreach on global democracy, conflict, and governance. It analyzes and seeks to improve international efforts to reduce democratic backsliding, mitigate conflict and violence, overcome political polarization, promote gender equality, and advance pro-democratic uses of new technologies. Learn More Last Wednesday, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government sharply escalated its use of repression by arresting Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, a leading voice of the opposition, and banning popular protests. As tens of thousands of protesters mobilized in defiance across the country, the Turkish regime cracked down even more harshly, detaining more than a thousand demonstrators, arresting journalists and imprisoning İmamoğlu. These events represent a dangerous turning point between democracy and full-blown authoritarianism for Türkiye’s already repressive regime. Since 2015, Turkey has been a textbook example of what political scientists call a competitive authoritarian regime: a system in which the government’s abuse of state power tilts the playing field of political competition in its favor. But so far, Erdoğan has avoided crossing the Rubicon of arresting his main rival. İmamoğlu, who was announced as the main opposition party’s presidential candidate on Monday, has consistently trailed Erdoğan in opinion polls. The central question Türkiye now faces is whether Erdoğan’s gamble to suppress dissent will succeed, or whether public and international pressure will force the regime to reverse course. Disturbingly, the best research in political science by scholars Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way suggests that two factors work strongly in the regime’s favor: an international environment conducive to repression and the ruling party’s broad influence over state institutions. But there is one important variable that works in the opposition’s favor: mass public protests that surprise the Turkish regime with their speed and scale, and that could spur Türkiye’s state institutions and the international community to support democratization. The first factor enabling Erdoğan’s increasing repression is geopolitical: Türkiye’s Western allies have become increasingly unable or unwilling to exert more democratic pressure. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described İmamoğlu’s arrest as “deeply worrying.” But the European Union has so far failed to impose significant costs, such as sanctions, on Turkish government officials in response to this pressure, almost certainly because of Ankara’s geopolitical clout. The EU is increasingly dependent on Türkiye as a military partner, especially as the new US administration suggests it will withdraw support for Ukraine. Earlier this month, Erdoğan signaled that Ankara could send peacekeepers to Ukraine. And since 2016, the EU has relied heavily on Türkiye for cooperation on limiting migration to Europe: Turkey hosts more than 3 million registered Syrian refugees. On the other side of the Atlantic, the new US administration has little interest in criticizing allies’ violations of democracy. In 2022, when a Turkish court convicted İmamoğlu in a separate, highly politicized case, the US State Department said it was “gravely concerned and disappointed” by the verdict. The State Department has so far made no such statement on the current situation. Instead, the administration is effectively giving the green light to Türkiye’s pressure. Last Friday, just days after İmamoğlu’s arrest, US special envoy Steve Witkoff described President Donald Trump’s latest phone call with Erdoğan as “wonderful.” On Tuesday, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with his Turkish counterpart in Washington to discuss warmer relations, mentioning only briefly “concerns about recent arrests and protests in Türkiye.” Erdoğan’s second trump card is domestic policy: Turkey’s government controls a well-organized, coercive state apparatus. Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) have been in power for more than two decades. They have purged and filled state institutions, wielding a huge influence over Türkiye’s judiciary, police and military.