Turkey and the Return of Trump The return of Donald Trump to the presidency raises cautious expectations in Turkey. While Ankara hopes to benefit from his aspirations to de-escalate conflicts, particularly in Ukraine, tensions remain over issues such as U.S. support for Syrian Kurds and the Palestinian question. The appointment of individuals hostile to Turkey within his administration fuels concerns, despite opportunities presented by recent regional upheavals. Analyses Share 18th December 2024 × REUTERS. (RUDAW) Authors This article was initially published by the Mediterranean Foundation for Strategic Studies (FMES) on November 26, 2024. CFRI obtained prior permission from both FMES and Jean Marcou to republish this article. Jean Marcou is also associate researcher at FMES Institute. To read the original article, please follow this link: https://fmes-france.org/en/turkey-and-the-return-of-trump/ Starting from November 6, 2024, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan openly congratulated "his friend Donald Trump" on X1 for his victory, referencing the "struggle" Trump had undertaken to be "re-elected." The language and tone of this reaction immediately echoed the personal closeness the two men had displayed during Trump's first term, reinforcing the idea that a new era was beginning for Turkish-American relations, following the prevailing sense of stagnation during Joe Biden's presidency. However, in recent months, Turkey has adopted a cautious approach to the U.S. elections2, stating its readiness to work with whoever emerged victorious. Indeed, Erdoğan was one of the few heads of state to phone the Republican candidate3 after the first attack Trump suffered during the summer. Yet, as was the case during Trump’s previous election, several indicators suggest that Turkey’s satisfaction primarily stems from the hope that the new presidency will not be worse than the previous one, rather than a belief that it will be significantly better. This is especially true as Donald Trump’s election comes at a time when Turkey is experiencing a period of uncertainty. Domestically, despite their victory in the 2023 general elections4, Erdoğan and the AKP appear increasingly destined for decline. Over the past year and a half, the Turkish economy has been reoriented by traditional measures, notably the central bank's key interest rate, which was abruptly raised from 8% to 50% and has been maintained at this level even more recently5, under the guidance of Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek. Despite slight and recent improvements—such as the stabilisation of inflation and the halt of the depreciation of the national currency—the Turkish economy has not returned to the prosperous years that had long kept the AKP in power, following its early electoral successes at the turn of the millennium. In March 2024, during the local elections, the ruling party suffered its first true electoral defeat6, not only failing to regain the key metropolitan cities of Ankara and Istanbul, which it had lost in 2019, but also being decisively outpaced at the national level by the Kemalist CHP, the leading opposition party. The resulting challenge is not an easy one for the man who has governed Turkey for 22 years, as he now faces the task of halting the inexorable rise of the opposition, while also finding a way to amend the Constitution to allow him to run for the presidency again in 2028. Given the growing discontent, many believe that early elections could further accelerate this perilous deadline. On the international stage, after its successes in mediating the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and demonstrating its ability to balance a bold stance between Kyiv and Moscow, Turkey has struggled to find its place in a Middle East shaken by the reactivation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since October 7, 2023. Marginalised in attempts to resolve this crisis, it has ultimately found itself caught between two sources of tension—on the Black Sea and in the Eastern Mediterranean7—that perpetuate a lasting instability, which is hardly conducive to the recovery of its economy. In this context, Erdoğan's initial optimism following the announcement of the U.S. presidential election results was not enough to bridge the deep sense of perplexity into which the prospect of Trump’s return had plunged not only the leaders but also the Turkish political class and society at large. However, the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime changes the situation and represents, in many ways, a silver lining for Turkey that must be taken into account, even though the consequences of this event remain uncertain8. Beginning with an analysis of the diplomatic and political affinities between the Turkish and American leaders (1 & 2), this article focuses on two key issues—the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Syrian crisis, and the related Kurdish question—that could generate renewed conflict between the two countries (3 & 4). It then examines the future of their recurring disagreements (5) and